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/home/byk/.local/share/opencode-v2-pilot/config/opencode, /home/byk/.local/share/opencode-v2-pilot/opencode-v2.service, /home/byk/.local/share/opencode-v2-pilot/CUTOVER.md, and /tmp/opencode/pty-plugin-smoke.ts.apply_patch.child_process + /usr/bin/script PTY implementation running under byk, removing pty-transport.ts, and removing every candidate supervisor/helper/readiness dependency.tsgo, running the adversarial smoke harness exactly 10 times, and running unprivileged systemd-analyze verify.No files found; the displayed results did not identify the searched paths or patterns./home/byk/.local/share/opencode-v2-pilot/config/opencode/node_modules/effect contained exactly 8 displayed entries: AGENTS.md, ai-docs/, CLAUDE.md, dist/, LICENSE, package.json, README.md, and src/./home/byk/.local/share/opencode-v2-pilot/config/opencode/node_modules/effect/dist reported 555 entries; the tool displayed the first 100, consisting of .d.ts, .d.ts.map, .js, and .js.map artifacts for modules beginning with Array, BigDecimal, BigInt, Boolean, Brand, Cache, Cause, Channel, ChannelSchema, Chunk, Clock, Combiner, Config, ConfigProvider, Console, Context, Cron, Crypto, Data, DateTime, Deferred, Differ, Duration, Effect, and Effectable.model values always to include a provider prefix, for example "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6".mcp[name].command to be an array of strings, never a single string; type is required.description are filtered out and never surfaced to the model; skill descriptions must explain both what the skill does and when to use it, use third person, and front-load concrete trigger keywords or filenames./home/byk/.local/share/opencode-v2-pilot/config/opencode/plugins/pty.ts was shown as exactly 823 lines and already implemented a direct backend using spawn from node:child_process, /usr/bin/script, /bin/sh, cwd descriptor binding through /proc/self/fd/${directory.fd}, and a fixed environment for user byk.plugins/pty.ts imports Plugin from @opencode/plugin, Context from @opencode/plugin/plugin, ToolContext from @opencode/plugin/tool, Schema from effect, spawn, open, realpath, FileHandle, constants, Readable, and StringDecoder.plugins/pty.ts defines limits exactly as: MAX_SESSIONS=16, MAX_SESSIONS_PER_OWNER=5, DEFAULT_READ_LIMIT=500, MAX_READ_LIMIT=2_000, MAX_READ_OFFSET=10_000, MAX_LINE_LENGTH=2_000, MAX_PATTERN_LENGTH=500, MAX_WRITE_SIZE=65_536, MAX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS=3_600, CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS=27_000, NOTIFICATION_TIMEOUT_MS=5_000, IO_TIMEOUT_MS=NOTIFICATION_TIMEOUT_MS, MAX_COMMAND_LENGTH=4_096, MAX_ARGUMENTS=128, MAX_ARGUMENT_LENGTH=16_384, MAX_ARGUMENT_BYTES=65_536, MAX_PATH_LENGTH=4_096, MAX_TITLE_LENGTH=500, MAX_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH=2_000, MAX_REGEX_WORKERS=4, MAX_BUFFER_SIZE=1_000_000, and TERMINATE_TIMEOUT_MS=2_000.plugins/pty.ts uses SCRIPT_PATH="/usr/bin/script" and SHELL_PATH="/bin/sh" with fixed environment HOME=/home/byk, LANG=C.UTF-8, LOGNAME=byk, PATH=/usr/bin:/bin, SHELL=/bin/sh, TERM=xterm-256color, and USER=byk.createPtyPlugin() registers tools in this order: 1. pty_spawn starts an interactive background PTY and optionally sends a synthetic exit notification; 2. pty_write writes decoded input/control characters; 3. pty_read returns buffered output by line range or extended-regex match; 4. pty_list lists sessions owned by the calling parent Session; 5. pty_kill stops a session and optionally removes its buffered output.pty_spawn, pty_write, and pty_kill use permission "shell"; all five tools set codemode:false, while read/list do not declare shell permission.pty_spawn validates command/argument bounds, tracks global and per-owner atomic reservations with reserved, reservations, pendingSpawns, and ownerSpawns, permits at most 16 total sessions and 5 per owner, evicts one inactive owned session when the owner limit is reached, rejects deleted parent Sessions, and creates IDs in the form pty_${crypto.randomUUID().replaceAll("-", "").slice(0, 8)}.id, title, description, command, args, authorized workdir, status, notifyOnExit, optional timeout, timedOut, exit code/signal, command PID, creation timestamp, parent Session ID, process handle, timer, close/termination promises, and a rolling output buffer capped at 1_000_000 characters.{ output: text, content: text }; envelope types include "pty.spawn", "pty.write", "pty.read", "pty.kill", and synthetic notification "pty.exit".ctx.session.synthetic() with delivery:"steer", a description beginning PTY exited:, and JSON fields id, truncated description, exitCode, exitSignal, timeoutSeconds, timedOut, outputLines, and truncated lastLine; notification operations are bounded to 5_000 ms.openPtyProcess() invokes /usr/bin/script with arguments ["-q", "-e", "-f", "-c", \printf '%s\n' "$$" >&3; exec 3>&-; exec ${shellCommand(command, args)}`, "/dev/null"], options cwd:/proc/self/fd/${directory.fd}, detached:true, fixed env, and stdio:["pipe","pipe","pipe","pipe"]; fd 3` reports the inner command PID.openPtyProcess() shell-quotes each command/argument via shellCommand(), buffers output emitted before listener registration, decodes stdout/stderr independently with StringDecoder("utf8"), validates the fd-3 PID as a positive decimal line no longer than 32 characters, and maps wrapper exits 143 and 137 to SIGTERM and SIGKILL./usr/bin/script wrapper process group with SIGTERM, waits 2_000 ms, escalates both to SIGKILL, then requires both child close and disappearance of both process groups; session-level stop operations are bounded by 27_000 ms.authorize() resolves both requested workdir and project directory, asks external_directory permission when the resolved workdir lies outside the project, asks shell permission for the exact quoted command, re-resolves after approval to detect changes, opens the directory with O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW, verifies it is a directory, and confirms /proc/self/fd/${handle.fd} still resolves to the approved directory before spawn.validateCommand() rejects empty commands, command or argument NUL bytes, more than 128 arguments, command UTF-8 size above 4_096 bytes, any argument above 16_384 bytes, and aggregate argument UTF-8 size above 65_536 bytes.pty_write decodes \n, \r, \t, \xNN, \uNNNN, and \\, then separately enforces the post-decoding 65_536 UTF-8-byte limit, re-authorizes shell permission including the input representation, rechecks ownership/status, and bounds the write to 5_000 ms./usr/bin/grep with ["-a","-m",String(limit),"-nE",...(ignoreCase?["-i"]:[]),"--",pattern], allow at most 4 concurrent regex workers, kill grep after 250 ms, cap captured stdout at 2_000_000 bytes and stderr at 2_000 bytes, treat exit code 1 as no matches, and return parsed line-number/text pairs.closing=true, aborts event subscription, and waits up to 27_000 ms for pending spawns, all session removals, and pending notifications.